How do inner screens enable imaginative experience? Applying the free-energy principle directly to the study of conscious experience.

Authors

Chris Fields, Mahault Albarracin, Karl Friston, Alex Kiefer, Maxwell J D Ramstead, Adam Safron

Published in

Neuroscience of consciousness. Volume 2025. Issue 1. Pages niaf009. Epub Apr 22, 2025.

Abstract

This paper examines the constraints that the free-energy principle (FEP) places on possible model of consciousness, particularly models of attentional control and imaginative experiences, including episodic memory and planning. We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on their application to multi-component systems, in which only some components interact directly with the external environment. In particular, we discuss the role of internal boundaries that have the structure of Markov blankets, and hence function as classical information channels between components. We then show how this formal structure supports models of attentional control and imaginative experience, with a focus on (i) how imaginative experience can employ the spatio-temporal and object-recognition reference frames employed in ordinary, non-imaginative experience and (ii) how imaginative experience can be internally generated but still surprising. We conclude by discussing the implementation, phenomenology, and phylogeny of imaginative experience, and the implications of the large state and trait variability of imaginative experience in humans.

PMID:
40265192
Bibliographic data and abstract were imported from PubMed on 23 Apr 2025.

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