From the Selfish Gene to the "We": Cooperation Often Needs Suppressors.

Authors

Michel Salzet

Published in

BioEssays : news and reviews in molecular, cellular and developmental biology. Volume 48. Issue 7. Pages e70161.

Abstract

Human cooperation is often explained through motivations and values, but it is also a strategic and evolutionary problem: locally advantageous behavior can erode the collective arrangements on which everyone depends. Dawkins' gene-centered view remains useful here, not as a moral theory of selfish people, but as a way to track how lower-level selection can destabilize higher-level organization. I argue, however, that cooperation is stabilized by a broader repertoire than external punishment alone. Repeated interaction, partner choice, aligned incentives, and architectural constraints can all make cheating unattractive; in many settings, additional suppressors then make defection costly or unprofitable. On this view, game theory and a multilevel evolutionary lens are complementary. The Folk Theorem shows how cooperative outcomes can be sustained endogenously under patience and monitoring, while biology shows how the informational and structural conditions for such equilibria are themselves produced or maintained. The point is diagnostic rather than fatalistic: cooperation is typically conditional, costly to sustain, and shaped by trade-offs, but humans can redesign incentives and institutions, especially in digital environments where misinformation and attention now propagate with unusual speed and fidelity.

PMID:
42418281
Bibliographic data and abstract were imported from PubMed on 09 Jul 2026.

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