Zealots can both promote and undermine cooperation in the generalized optional public goods game.

Authors

Yuting Dong, Shulan Li, Lei Shi

Published in

Chaos (Woodbury, N.Y.). Volume 36. Issue 9. Sep 01, 2026.

Abstract

Previous theoretical and empirical studies have shown that zealots-individuals who consistently cooperate and never adapt-generally enhance collective cooperation. However, this conclusion largely relies on the assumption that participation is compulsory. Here, we examine how zealots affect the evolution of cooperation in a generalized optional public goods game, where individuals can cooperate, defect, or opt out. Non-participants receive an external payoff and may also exert external effects on the public good. Using pairwise comparison dynamics in an infinite well-mixed population, we show that zealots do not necessarily promote cooperation. Cooperation is enhanced only at moderate zealot densities when non-participants negatively affect the public good. Otherwise, higher zealot densities or non-negative effects from non-participants lead zealots to undermine cooperation. These findings reveal a dual role of zealots, determined by their density and the external influence of non-participants on the public good.

PMID:
42770899
Bibliographic data and abstract were imported from PubMed on 22 Sep 2026.

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