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The game-theoretical analysis of multiple Nash equilibria of a cholera epidemic model with non-exponential distributions.

Created on 07 Nov 2026

Authors

Junyuan Yang, Yiqian Bai, Shasha Gao

Published in

Journal of theoretical biology. Pages 112641. Nov 06, 2026. Epub Nov 06, 2026.

Abstract

Cholera continues to persist in regions characterized by inadequate sanitation and poverty, where vaccination and clean water are recommended as primary preventive measures. This study aims to determine the utility maximizing action for individuals in the absence of government intervention, particularly when the age of infection follows some general distributions, including Exponential, Gamma, and Weibull distributions. To this end, we develop a game-theoretical cholera transmission model incorporating age-structure. In this model, individuals evaluate the associated benefits and infection risks to determine whether to vaccinate or use clean water, thereby establishing a payoff function. The findings reveal that imperfect vaccine efficacy results in the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, and the conditions for these equilibria vary depending on the distribution. Numerical simulations further indicate that, under the same mean, smaller variance necessitates higher vaccine efficacy to enable the occurrence of multiple Nash equilibria. Additionally, we examine how relative costs influence strategy selection when both vaccination and clean water are used simultaneously. The results infer that, due to the relatively high cost of clean water, individuals are more inclined to choose vaccination.

PMID:
42994559
Bibliographic data and abstract were imported from PubMed on 07 Nov 2026.

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