Hiring in life sciences? Share your open positions with our professional community. Read more Close

Advertisement

A prospective method to support Unmanned Aircraft Systems operators in the application of Specific Operations Risk Assessment.

Created on 17 Nov 2026

Authors

Rebeca González-Pérez, Álvaro Gómez-Rodríguez, Alejandro Sanchez-Carmona, Cristina Cuerno-Rejado

Published in

PloS one. Volume 21. Issue 11. Pages e0362358. Epub Nov 16, 2026.

Abstract

Within the current European regulatory framework, in order to be authorised to perform Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) flights under the specific category of operations, applicants are required to conduct an operational risk assessment. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) selects the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) methodology as its recommended means to perform this risk evaluation. However, some aspects of this methodology and its application are left relatively open, especially regarding the compliance with the requirements of its safety measures, called Operational Safety Objectives (OSOs). This might complicate the application of SORA, which would benefit from further guidance for its quantitative implementation. Seeking to streamline some aspects of this methodology, this paper presents the Fish Shoal Method (FSM), which combines SORA with two widespread risk analysis methods: bow-tie and Fault Tree Analysis. The synthesis of these methodologies results in a novel method that aims to provide clarity to SORA and to support applicants in the task of determining if their safety requirements are properly substantiated. The practical feasibility of FSM is demonstrated through a worked numerical example of a real UAS operation, focused on the requirements of the procedure-related OSO#08. FSM serves as a guidance to assess the performance of OSOs and make a preliminary estimation of whether the target level of safety of the operation is achieved. Since FSM formalises the main elements of SORA following a causality approach, it also allows the identification of those safety-critical items of the UAS operation that may require further attention. The outcomes of this practical example show that, even in low-risk operations, where the requirements of safety measures are less stringent, the target level of safety for OSOs aimed at human factors are too demanding from a quantitative point of view.

PMID:
43038297
Bibliographic data and abstract were imported from PubMed on 17 Nov 2026.

Read full publication at:
Please sign in to see all details.

Advertisement

Stats

  • Community rating n/a 0 votes
  • Reviewers' rating n/a 0 votes
  • Your rating

1-terrible, 9-excellent. How would you rate this publication? Sign in in to submit your rating.

  • Recommendations n/a n/a positive of 0 vote(s)
  • Views 18
  • Comments 0

Recommended by

  • No recommendations yet.

Post a comment

You need to be signed in to post comments. You can sign in here.

Comments

There are no comments yet.

Advertisement